Abstract: This chapter focuses on three questions in its quest to better understand the historical and comparative perspectives of charity regulation. Accepting the traditional rationales for such regulation, it first explores the question of 'how we regulate' followed by the interrelated question of the associated cost of such regulation. Finally, the chapter examines the important issues concerning how we currently (or could better) measure the success of charity regulatory efforts. The paper draws upon the experiences of charity regulators in a range of common law countries across the UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore.
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Since the turn of the twenty-first century there has been a noticeable global growth in the number of new charity regulators established, accompanied by a corresponding increase in the level of statutory regulation governing the charity sector. Where once upon a time there was only one country with an independent statutory regulator of charities (England -with the Charity Commission for England and Wales (CCEW)), the past decade has seen many more jurisdictions venture down the path of creating a bespoke charities regulator. Scotland (Edward Elgar, 2018) (Edward Elgar, 2018) 5 wave of regulation is harder to pin down. The stated reasons for the promulgation of charity legislation traditionally espouse, inter alia, the desire to increase public trust and confidence in charitable organisations, thereby giving both private funders and the public (both directly in the case of individual donations and indirectly through the tax reliefs afforded these entities) greater assurance in the good governance of the charities to which they donate. Such sentiments are often accompanied by the objective of preventing charity trustee fraud or mismanagement of charitable assets. The presence of this latter objective is usually demonstrated by the investigatory powers bestowed on the regulator and associated statutory powers to take miscreant charity trustees to task. In practice, perhaps less often cited but no less real drivers behind the introduction of charity regulation include the desire to prevent misuse of charitable funds for terrorism ends (following the events of 9/11) or often the need to deal with recent domestic charity scandals. These ongoing, if ad hoc, factors tend to provide a country with a renewed focus on strengthening (or in some countries, developing) a modern framework to regulate charities.
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There is, however, as we are often told, 'nothing new under the sun.' Recent research investigating the longitudinal patterns of charity regulation across sixteen jurisdictions identified recurring common issues that over time and territory have not abated but rather require constant regulatory engagement and management. 4 So, in setting out to examine the current comparative trends in charity regulation, one must not be blind to the lessons of history. Charity problems and solutions come and go, as do charity regulators but such (Edward Elgar, 2018) 6 vacuums are inevitably filled with new variations on old problems and with new regulators.
Understanding the nature of the problems faced is the first step towards crafting a regulatory solution. In situations of generic charity regulation 'problems', drawing on the wisdom and experience of both ancestral and peer regulators should provide us with richer possibilities to learn from previous successes and failures and, at the very least, not to repeat the mistakes of the past.
To this end, this chapter focuses on three main questions as it begins its quest to better understand the historical and comparative perspectives of charity regulation. Accepting the rationales offered above for charity regulation in the first instance, Section I considers the question of 'how we regulate' followed in Section II by the interrelated question of the associated cost of such regulation. Finally, Section III explores the important issues concerning how we currently (or could better) measure the success of our regulatory efforts.
Tackling these questions may better fit us for the challenge of ascertaining whether our charity policy goals in the areas of regulatory rationale, execution, cost and success are correctly aligned.
The How of Charity Regulation -Who Is in Charge?
A variety of regulatory models are currently in vogue across the common law countries active in the regulation of charities. The independent statutory regulator model leads the league (Edward Elgar, 2018) 15 Howsoever charities are regulated such regulation normally involves a registration and review process which, if successful, leads to entry upon the register of charities and obliges the registrant to comply with annual reporting obligations and, depending upon the jurisdiction and the nature of the charitable entity, certain disbursement guidelines. From the state's perspective, the establishment of a new government agency, its staffing and the introduction of new regulatory requirements involves certain sunk costs. As these establishment and registration costs level out over the initial years, they are replaced by annual monitoring costs (depending upon the level of sample audit of compliance undertaken), rolling reviews of the register (depending upon how clean the initial register was upon its primary population), and education and enforcement costs (depending upon the level of active engagement of the regulator with the charity sector). Thus, costs may change with the age of the regulator but may not necessarily lessen. (Edward Elgar, 2018) 19 Table 1 above sets out the establishment details of the charity regulators in seven commonlaw jurisdictions, along with their annual budgets, their staff sizes and the numbers of registered charities they were responsible for regulating as at year end 2016. Thus, it can be seen that, per capita, the best resourced charity regulator is the SCOC. With an annual budget of Sing$5.37m in 2016, it had 31 staff to regulate 2,217 registered charities. Three quarters of the SCOC's annual budget was consumed by staff costs, which is a higher ratio than the 2/3 median staff cost to total budget ratio for most of the other regulators examined. This is in direct contrast to its regulatory counterpart, the NZCS, which while also situated within a government department had staff costs in 2016 of just half its total annual budget. Ireland and Northern Ireland follow closely behind Singapore in terms of budget and staffing vis-à-vis the number of registered charities for which they are currently responsible. The least wellresourced regulators in this regard per number of registered charities are the British regulators with the CCEW's budgetary and staff cuts placing it in a position of having to manage on tighter ratios than its counterparts elsewhere. 39 Interrogating the budgetary situation should force us to consider which is the 'fittest for purpose' regulator, whether there is administrative slack in certain regimes and which regulators will struggle to deliver their regulatory objectives because of underinvestment.
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39 Of the two, CCEW is worse placed than OSCR in this regard as CCEW is also responsible for the oversight of 'excepted charities' which are not required to register. When these charities are included (the National Audit
Office estimated that there were at least 180,000 such excepted charities in 2012: see NAO, Regulating
Charities: A Landscape Review at 15) the staff/charity ratio for the CCEW increases to 1:1,211 and the spend per charity against total revenue decreases to 1:69.
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When we look at the ratio of staff to the number of registered charities, as set out in Table 2 below, further interesting aspects emerge. The most 'hardworking' regulatory agency would appear to be the NZCS with 756 registered charities per member of staff, followed by the CCEW and the ACNC. The CCEW, however, is the least well-resourced of these three regulators when it comes to actual spend per charity.
At the other end of the spectrum, once again Singapore tops the poll here with 72 registered charities per member of staff, followed by the CRA and CCNI who are both well off the median of 501. 
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Information Statement (AIS) return, with medium and large charities also filing separate financial returns. In a report released in 2015 reviewing the accuracy and quality of the submitted financial returns, the ACNC unveiled the results of its systematic review of the 2014 AIS data. According to the regulator, thousands of charities had made significant errors in their financial reporting with the three most common being classification errors (with charities incorrectly identifying themselves as small when in fact they were medium or medium when they were large); 43 calculation errors in the completion of the financial statements; and failures to lodge an annual financial report. 44 In its response to these findings, the ACNC embarked upon a major education campaign for registered charities and 
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ACNC's Corporate Plan 2016-17 further signals the regulator's intention to leverage its
'digital by default' approach to sound data, to make the promised charity passport a reality whereby authorised government agencies would be enabled to access ACNC charity data, eliminating duplicative reporting for charities -a definite, if at present unquantified, saving.
The dissemination of regulatory procedural learning of this nature is invaluable as first-time receipt of returns under a new financial reporting system is bound to be subject to glitches. (Edward Elgar, 2018) 25 public required by Scottish charity law. 47 By 2012, OSCR's focus on better accounting procedures led it to report on its measures of success and its evolving plans for future regulation:
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Accounting compliance has risen steadily as a result of our work as Regulator. In 2012-13, 90% of charity accounts met requirements or received a Qualified Pass. As part of our review of our services and procedures, we have begun a programme of work to develop a more risk-led approach to our monitoring of charities, focusing our resources on those areas we believe demand greater scrutiny and will examine the feasibility of publishing some charity accounts on our website to encourage transparency.
48
The lessons learnt through the process of report evaluation and the tried and tested incentives to encourage charities to file compliant returns on time will have relevance for other countries currently introducing new reporting regulations. 
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The financial crisis and subsequent economic recession adversely affected the resources available to many of the independent regulators over the past five years. In (Edward Elgar, 2018) (Edward Elgar, 2018) 28 the costs, benefits and risk of different models for regulating charities, and it has not identified the resources it needs to meet its statutory objectives.
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A year later, PAC found that 'the Commission does not know how much its activities cost and has not focused its resources on its priorities'. 58 The timing of these reports' comments on the poor performance and use of CCEW's resources came in the wake of the Cup Trust scandal, a one-trustee charity tax-avoidance scheme largely uncovered by HMRC following the 'astounding failure of the CCEW to close down the fake charity.' (Edward Elgar, 2018) 29 resource needs in the Commission's monitoring and enforcement work. 60 The NAO remained critical, however, of the CCEW's ability to understand the cost of regulating the sector effectively. In this regard, it stated that 'the Commission has not quantified the relative benefits of different activities, limiting its ability to take informed decisions about where best to direct its resources. It is important for the Commission to develop a good understanding of its unit costs to aid future funding negotiations with HM Treasury.' (Edward Elgar, 2018) 30 Governments should ensure that, when developing regulation, the priorities for the allocation of enforcement resources are informed by a cost-benefit analysis, based on effectiveness and efficiency criteria. This should include a consideration of whether compliance with the regulatory requirements can be expected to be achieved more efficiently through the mechanisms of civil litigation, market mechanisms and criminal law enforcement when needed. Going through such a process should also be used to ensure that, if it is found that inspection and enforcement by state agencies will indeed be needed, appropriate resources are foreseen and allocated, which is absolutely necessary to ensure results.
Forthcoming in Matthew Harding (ed.), The Research Handbook on Not-for-Profit Law
63
These comments are particularly pertinent in the context of charity regulation since in most cases neither beneficiaries nor the public have locus standi to enforce charity law directly and are dependent on the state agency (whether in the form of Attorney General, Charity
Regulator or other agency) acting in a parens patriae capacity to enforce the law, thereby ensuring continuing confidence that donors' charitable wishes will be respected. 64 The absence of civil litigation routes and market mechanisms (unless one is willing to consider sector self-regulation or co-regulation with the state as a useful avenue here) 65 leave statutory enforcement, or at least its deterrent power, as the most viable route from an enforcement 64 Breen (n 6). 65 On the interaction of state and non-state mechanisms for the regulation of charities see further Breen, Dunn and Sidel (n 4). (Edward Elgar, 2018) 31 perspective. Such enforcement, regardless of ultimate success, adds to the baseline cost of regulation.
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Causality is another important issue. As the OECD has highlighted:
[E]ven though it may appear that conditions are better than expected following adoption of a regulation, they might actually not be any better than they would have been without the regulatory treatment. To make further improvements, policymakers need to know how well existing treatments have worked. They need to know if outcomes can be causally attributed to regulatory activities. Not-for-Profit Law (Edward Elgar, 2018) 
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[t]he Commission has prioritised its roles and believes registration, compliance monitoring and investigation of concerns are essential. All other activities are categorised as desirable, and if registration and enquiries take longer and more resources than planned for, then work such as the development of advice and research will be delayed. 2016-2017 to 2018-2019 (2016) (Edward Elgar, 2018) 36 whether the costs imposed on charities by the need to respond to the triggering of a concern were justified, particularly since the triggers were retrospective and too focused on technical accounting compliance rather than better governance and fundraising compliance concerns.
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The effect of the changes introduced by targeted regulation may prove interesting in this light. The introduction of a new notifiable events regime puts the focus on charity selfassessment and sits alongside a revised annual reporting regime. 80 The new online annual return asks fewer questions of smaller charities and the qualitative information sought of charities differs greatly from the old financial exceptions regime. OSCR is currently developing a new way to analyse the annual return information, which remains unpublished at present due to the pilot nature of the scheme. By asking fewer but qualitatively more important questions of charities, OSCR hopes to use the charity responses, cross-referenced with the other information held on the charity (eg third party concerns) to allow it to identify in a more holistic fashion charities that potentially fall within one or more of the issues on its published targeted regulation framework. 81 The driving force behind OSCR's new approach is to protect charitable assets and beneficiaries and to protect the integrity of charitable status. (Edward Elgar, 2018) 37
The future outcomes of OSCR's targeted regulation will be awaited by all who profess an interest in aligning regulatory rationale, execution, cost and success. OSCR has had a good track record over the past decade in the building and maintenance of a robust charities register and in utilising annual returns to provide individual and sectoral feedback on both governance and reporting practices. Its second foray into risk profiling, which will see it revise its financial exceptions model, introduce its notifiable events regime and start to consider the data produced from these and other sources in a more holistic fashion, augur well for more joined up regulation. It may be that the new approach, when published by OSCR, will enable future researchers to find the necessary causal link between triggered exception and tangible outcome. 
Concluding Thoughts
In all cases, whether in the case of a new regulator setting up shop or a well-established regulator seeking more effective oversight, three key messages appear to hold true across the board, regardless of the regulatory model chosen.
First, having a reliable and robust register is key. A good register is the basis of good regulation. The right information needs to be present and its accuracy and ease of availability, not just to the regulator but to the public in general, is important. From the moment of environments) to the illegal (lack of public benefit, misrepresentation as a charity or inappropriately benefiting from charitable status).
82 See McDonnell (n 77). (Edward Elgar, 2018) 38 establishment, when the objective may be simply to map the sector, through to 'business as usual' when the reliability of register information becomes essential for the regulator's monitoring and enforcement purposes, right up to the broader (but no less important) need for the state to have reliable data on the charity sector to facilitate better government policy and planning, the ongoing important role played by the register should be recognised and properly resourced.
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Second, a charity register is only as good as the data that it holds. Data integrity, in turn, depends upon the accuracy and timeliness of the data received. This plays into the larger need for on-time reporting of the right information, captured in a way that makes it usable (by more than one regulator) and user-friendly. Asking the right questions of charities that will allow regulators to interrogate the data received, usefully compare it across the sector and then triage it for selective follow-up, is an ongoing challenge but much can be learnt from regulators' experiences -both positive and negative -in this regard. Information sought from charities must earn its keep and have value when it comes to measuring compliance.
Asking too much information of charities and underutilising it is as bad as seeking none.
Finding a way to gather and process information on charities so that it can be recycled on demand for the needs of other interested regulators is a goal worth pursuing. The work of the ACNC on the development and roll out of the charity passport will thus be viewed with interest by many.
Third, and finally, a good data stream, while vital to good regulation, is not an end in itself.
Risk profiling should, and finite resources will, push regulators to ask only for data that can answer the good stewardship question, or at least prompt further questions with which regulators should be concerned if they are serious about protecting charitable assets and (Edward Elgar, 2018) 39 maintaining public confidence in charities. The squeeze on resources may even see a broadening of the requirement for charities to pay for the privilege of complying with charity law in the future beyond New Zealand to other countries. 83 The new Scottish approach to targeted regulation alongside the NAO mandated requirement for the CCEW to begin to causally link regulatory inputs with regulatory outcomes is likely to provide further food for thought. The jury is out on the effects on compliance of replacing general guidance, education and charity support to the sector as whole with a self-reporting regime for serious incidents requirement, with some querying whether there is a legal duty on charities to report serious incidents outside of the annual report.
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Reviewing the rationale for charity regulation against the likely level of regulatory intervention required (whether at the investigation or enforcement stage) and staffing numbers across the various registration/investigation/engagement divisions in light of the achievements of those divisions may help to identify where regulatory effort is being placed 83 The NZCS charges all charities with a gross annual income in excess of NZ$10,000 a fee to file their annual returns, with a cheaper fee for those who file online: see 'Fee Summary' (Charities Services) <https://charities.govt.nz/im-a-registered-charity/annual-returns/fee-summary> accessed 17 September 2017.
The Irish CRA has a statutory facility to charge charities for filing but it has not yet moved to do so: Charities (Edward Elgar, 2018) 40 and what is being counted as an outcome of regulatory success. The budgeting challenge ahead for policymakers and state funders when it comes to charity regulation may be one of walking the fine line between knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing. For regulators, avoiding the resourcing trap, known in other circles as the 'non-profit starvation cycle' 85 in the context of charity regulation and oversight is essential and makes the process of aligning regulatory rationale, execution costs and measures of regulatory success ever more important.
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